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Foreword
Over the past five years, and since the Commission published its last paper 
authored by Dr Katie Boyle on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the debate 
in Scotland around strengthening accountability for the implementation of 
international human rights standards has significantly progressed. Stimulated, 
in part, by the decision at a UK level to leave the European Union; in part, 
by the newly devolved powers; and in part, by the fallout from the global 
financial crisis and Westminster driven “austerity” measures and “welfare reform” 
the Scottish Parliament, Government, First Minister and civil society have all 
increasingly engaged in debate around the protection and implementation of 
economic, social and cultural rights (ESCR).
The Commission has brought ESCR into the foreground of its work to 
develop a human rights culture in Scotland. We set out our broad vision for 
the realisation of ESCR in our input to the government’s “Creating a Fairer 
Scotland” initiative in 2015. This set out the need for ESCR to be embedded 
through law, policy and practice. Since then we have worked to follow up on 
each of these strands, raising awareness and understanding of ESCR across all 
actors; supporting communities to use the rights in their advocacy for change; 
contributing expertise to the revised National Performance Framework 
and developing further thinking and emerging practice on human rights 
budgeting.
Above all however the Commission has continued to make the case for 
the incorporation, or domestic enforceability of international human rights 
standards, in particular ESCR. This is because accountability is the cornerstone 
of human rights and we believe that further culture change can be driven by a 
backstop of legal protection and judicial enforcement.
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This report highlights that there is an accountability gap in the UK and in 
Scotland when it comes to the implementation and enforcement of ESCR and 
other rights contained in international law. This means that when it comes to 
the realisation of the rights to an adequate standard of living, health, housing, 
food or social security people have limited recourse to human rights law 
where their rights are not met in practice.
The research shows how countries all over the world from Germany and 
Switzerland to South Africa and Colombia have stronger laws and stronger 
accountability processes for these rights. The research shows how around 65 
countries globally explicitly enshrine ESCR in their constitutions, around 12 
in Europe. Alongside this countries such as Finland and Sweden have built in 
parliamentary scrutiny of whether ESCR are being implemented. The research 
demonstrates how Scotland has the opportunity to draw from this and build 
on its existing laws, judicial reasoning, legal remedies and parliamentary 
processes to better protect a broader range of human rights.
The First Minister’s Advisory Group on Human Rights Leadership, of which 
the Commission is a member, reports later this year on the protection of 
economic, social and environmental rights. It is clear from this research that 
there is wealth of experience and practice globally which Scotland can learn 
from, replicate and build on.
We thank Dr Boyle, formerly of the University of Roehampton and now the 
University of Stirling, for this valuable work at this important time.
Judith Robertson 
Chair of the Scottish Human Rights Commission
Scottish Human Rights Commission
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1. Introduction
The incorporation of international law into domestic law means embedding legal 
standards as set out in international law and making them enforceable at the domestic 
level. This incorporation can take many different forms. This paper seeks to set out some 
of the ways through which Scotland could incorporate economic, social and cultural 
(ESC) rights into the domestic legal framework. Traditionally incorporation has been 
understood as a way of directly embedding international law into the domestic legal 
system through domestic legislation or in a constitutional text. This paper embraces 
a much broader and fuller understanding of incorporation essentially encapsulating 
a variety of means through which international legal standards are internalised into 
the domestic legal system and coupled with effective remedies. The paper therefore 
looks at models of incorporation as well as justiciability mechanisms (how rights can be 
enforced in court).1
Ultimately it is for each state to decide how best to give effect to international human 
rights obligations in its specific constitutional context. Incorporation and justiciability of 
ESC rights is not a new phenomenon. It has occurred across the globe in different ways. 
This paper sets out potential pathways for Scotland so that processes on human rights 
reform continue to be informed by evidence and best practice drawing from a number 
of the international comparative examples.
Scotland is already on a journey of incorporation in relation to a number of human 
rights. For example, it is following in the footsteps of other jurisdictions including 
Norway, Belgium, Spain and most recently Sweden2 in its proposals to incorporate 
‘the principles of the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child’.3 The UNCRC is a treaty 
that encapsulates the civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of the child. In 
addition, the First Minster’s Advisory Group is tasked with considering how Scotland 
can continue to lead by example in human rights, including economic, social, cultural 
and environmental rights and potential incorporation of those rights into domestic law.4 
This paper is intended to help facilitate the ongoing discussions on how Scotland can 
embed international human rights law into the domestic framework.
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2. What do we mean 
by economic, social and 
cultural rights?
Following on from the Second World War nations throughout the world sought to 
declare a commitment to dignity and human rights. This culminated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 followed by two subsequent Covenants, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). These treaties are known 
collectively as the International Bill of Rights.5 The international human rights structure 
comprises of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights as established in the 
International Bill of Rights. Civil and political rights include rights such as the right 
to a fair trial or the right to vote. Economic, social and cultural rights include rights 
such as the right to education, the right to fair employment conditions, the right to 
adequate housing and the right to the highest attainable standard of healthcare. It was 
intended that each of the rights (civil, political, economic, social and cultural) would be 
implemented concurrently and according to the principle of indivisibility.6 Subsequent 
international treaties at both the international and regional level have confirmed the 
legally binding status of these rights and their indivisible nature.7
One of the major challenges facing Scotland, and the rest of the UK, is that the legal 
system only provides for a select number of rights – largely civil and political (CP) rights, 
and not economic, social and cultural (ESC) rights, under the current constitutional 
frameworks. This is out of step with constitutional arrangements comparatively 
speaking (see table of constitutions protecting CPESC rights below at Annex A.). This 
creates accountability gaps in ensuring access to justice for those rights not currently 
protected under the Scotland Act 1998, the Human Rights Act 1998, the European 
Communities Act 1972 or the common law.
3Models of Incorporation and Justiciability for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
3. Why incorporate 
ESC rights?
The benefits of incorporating ESC rights are self-evident in many respects – it means 
that individuals will have better access to rights directly relating to their conditions 
of living. This includes the better protection of employment rights8, rights relating to 
pensions9, rights which protect an adequate standard of living (including access to 
adequate housing and food)10, rights relating to health and healthcare11 and rights 
relating to education,12 among others. It would ensure that vulnerable and marginalised 
groups, including children, the elderly, the disabled and the unemployed receive 
protection in the progressive realisation of their rights. ESC rights enforcement assists in 
the alleviation of the causes and consequences of poverty.13 There is significant scope 
to mainstream ESC rights as part of an approach to policy formation and the wider 
decision making process in the same way that the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR) features. There is a significant accountability gap for those experiencing 
violations of ESC rights in Scotland and the UK more widely. This is because domestic 
law does not currently protect the full body of international human rights law and as a 
result people are left without access to remedies when a violation of their right occurs.
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4. Addressing the 
ESC accountability gap
There is an accountability gap in the UK and Scottish legal systems with regard to 
the protection of ESC rights. The implementation and observance of the full body of 
international human rights law is not captured under the UK domestic constitutional 
framework, or currently under the devolved framework, meaning domestic statutes 
and policies are not necessarily implemented or measured with full reference to 
international human rights law. As a result decision makers in Scotland are not always 
under a statutory duty to take international human rights law into consideration when 
performing their functions.14
The UK at the national level has agreed to be bound by a number of international 
treaties that do not take on enforceable legal obligations unless incorporated into 
domestic law. The enforceability of the rights contained in international treaties varies 
across the UK jurisdictions meaning different rights and remedies exist for civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights depending on where you live. Some jurisdictions 
have more progressive measures than others in connection with different rights15 and 
the devolved structures themselves create different frameworks for equality and human 
rights meaning there is no universal application or operation of a normative national 
standard for human rights law but multiple different regimes at play at the same time.16 
This picture is further complicated by withdrawal from the EU and the impact of Brexit, 
including the loss of remedies for violations of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights available under EU law.17
In submissions to the United Nations treaty monitoring processes the UK cites the 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the devolved statutes each of which partially incorporate 
the ECHR into domestic law as evidence of complying with international human rights 
obligations.18 However, although there is a possibility of extending the interpretation 
of CP rights to include socio-economic dimensions, relying on the ECHR treaty as a 
human rights document is inherently limited because the treaty does not cover all 
aspects of all human rights.19 The UK also cites the application of domestic statutes 
and policies as examples of implementing ESC rights in accordance with international 
legal obligations20 as well as equality legislation and legislation providing for legal 
aid.21 However, domestic statutes relating to areas such as health, welfare, housing, 
employment, education and access to legal aid are not necessarily benchmarked 
against international standards meaning that statutory rights do not necessarily 
reflect the state’s international obligations. An example of this would be the National 
Minimum Wage Act 1998 which sets a minimum hourly income for workers in the UK. 
The purpose of this Act is to ensure that persons who are working are able to earn 
sufficient remuneration for work in order to support an adequate standard of living. 
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However, on an independent examination of the UK national minimum wage the 
European Social Committee has determined it unfit for purpose and ‘manifestly unfair’ 
in achieving the aim of raising workers out of poverty.22 Relying on legislative and 
administrative implementation of rights without reference to international standards (at 
least implicitly) creates an accountability gap for the UK as state party to international 
treaties. The UK has not incorporated these obligations into domestic law and continues 
to dismiss calls for incorporation from the UN Committee responsible for overseeing 
compliance with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
For example, in 2014 when responding to the UN Committee on ESC Rights the UK 
rejected the incorporation or justiciability of ESC rights stating:
‘There is no provision in the ICESCR that requires States Parties to incorporate 
the Covenant into domestic law or to accord to it a specific status in domestic 
law. The UK Government therefore continues to consider that its method 
of implementation of the ICESCR, through appropriate legislation and 
administrative measures, ensures the fulfilment of its obligations under the 
Covenant.’23
The UN Committee responded by reiterating concerns about the UK’s accountability 
gap stating:
‘While the Committee takes note of the State party’s views on the 
incorporation of the Covenant rights into the domestic legislation, the 
Committee regrets that the Covenant rights cannot be applied directly by 
domestic courts, which may restrict access to effective legal remedies for 
violations of Covenant rights. The Committee…urges the State party to fully 
incorporate the Covenant rights into its domestic legal order and ensure that 
victims of violations of economic, social and cultural rights have full access to 
effective legal remedies.’24
Incorporation coupled with effective legal remedies is a way of closing this 
accountability gap.
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5. The nature of state 
obligations to respect, protect 
and fulfil ESC rights
The nature of ESC rights requires states to respect, protect and fulfil these rights in order 
to progressively achieve them to the maximum available resources.25 Some rights 
require immediate implementation, meaning that there is a ‘minimum core’ that is 
non-derogable. Other rights require a greater degree of progressive realisation through 
various degrees of enforcement.26 It is also possible to place limitations on some rights 
in the same way interference with CP rights can be justified in certain circumstances. 
Incorporation of the rights into the domestic legal system would reflect the varying 
levels of fulfilment required with scope to balance fulfilment of a right against other 
countervailing factors. For example, ESC rights implementation does not mean granting 
everyone immediately the right to the highest attainable standard of health, or granting 
everyone the right to a privately owned dwelling house and so on. There is a sensible 
and balanced approach to ESC implementation which allows for the balancing of rights 
(including competing rights), the potential to place limitations on rights in accordance 
with the law and which takes into account the allocation of limited resources across 
multiple areas of policy.
The principle of indivisibility
The principle of indivisibility is an important aspect of the purpose and function of 
human rights and means that the fulfilment and enjoyment of one right is dependent 
on the protection and fulfilment of another.27 That is to say for example that the right to 
life is dependent on the right to adequate health care, the right to an adequate standard 
of living and the right to adequate housing. Likewise, full enjoyment of the right to vote 
and the right to political participation is dependent on exercise of the right to education 
and the right to freedom of expression, the right to protest or the right to collectively 
bargain. The full enjoyment of civil and political (CP) rights is therefore dependent on 
the protection and fulfilment of ESC rights – the preparatory work to the international 
treaties reveals that protecting civil and political rights and not economic social and 
cultural rights was considered an “anachronism in the twentieth century to provide for 
the protection of one without the other.”28
7Models of Incorporation and Justiciability for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Progressive realisation
The nature of the obligation in international law requires that states respect, protect and 
fulfil ESC rights. This means states should progressively improve the protection of rights 
to the maximum of their available resources (i.e. the actual and potential resources the 
state can generate in order to effectively implement them). The State must take steps to 
refrain from acting in a way that would undermine ESC rights – i.e. take any action that 
results in breaching the rights (the duty to RESPECT); the State must also take action 
to prevent others from interfering with enjoyment of ESC rights, including private third 
parties that may be responsible for administering access/ delivering ESC rights (the 
duty to PROTECT); and the State must facilitate, promote and provide the ESC rights by 
taking the necessary steps to ensure the right can be enjoyed by all to the maximum of 
its available resources (the duty to FULFIL). States should avoid measures which reduce 
enjoyment of ESC rights (non-retrogression). Any violation (breach) of a right can only 
be justified in the most exceptional of circumstances and States must be able to explain 
that the action was reasonable, proportionate, non-discriminatory and that all other 
potential alternatives were considered.
In addition, it is also important to note that states obligations include facilitating access 
an effective remedy if there is a failure to meet human rights obligations.29 This includes 
facilitating access to a legal remedy in court if necessary.30
Minimum core
Over and above the duty to respect, protect and fulfil, or to progressively realise, 
ESC rights there is a requirement that all States must provide a basic level of rights 
enjoyment with immediate effect. This is called a minimum core. This can be understood 
as a non-negotiable absolute right to a basic level of subsistence below which no 
person should fall. The minimum core means providing a minimum essential level of 
benefits to all individuals and families that will enable them to acquire at least essential 
health care, basic shelter and housing, water and sanitation, foodstuffs, and the most 
basic forms of education.31
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Human Dignity as a Social Minimum
Many countries embed the right to a social minimum reflecting the concept of 
the minimum core – i.e. a social floor that ensures no one falls into destitution. 
According to constitutional theory, a minimum level of subsistence is a 
constitutional essential for the functioning of a democracy.32 This is premised 
on the idea that people need to be able to access basic essentials in order to 
participate in society and facilitate genuine autonomy.33 Often the threshold 
for assessing compliance with a minimum level is based on the concept of 
human dignity.34 The approach of an absolute minimum guarantee is evident, 
for example, in the constitutions of Germany (‘existenz minimum’)35, Belgium 
(‘minimex’),36 Switzerland (‘conditions minimales d’existence’),37 Colombia (minimo 
vítal) and Brazil (‘mínimo existencial’)38. There is no such constitutional guarantee 
to a basic minimum in the UK or Scotland at the moment.
Non-discrimination
Non-discrimination is an important cross-cutting component of international human 
rights law present across all of the human rights treaties and the principal focus of some 
of the core treaties such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women. Equality and non-discrimination in international human rights law 
requires states to take steps to eliminate discrimination in order to achieve substantive 
equality of outcome and address structural injustices. International law requires that 
access and delivery of human rights, including ESC rights should not exclude groups, 
particularly those who are marginalised and possibly ‘hidden’ from the system.
This means that before designing and implementing inclusive systems that provide 
ESC rights decision makers should explore and understand who are the disadvantaged 
and excluded social groups and what their needs and vulnerabilities are.39 This means 
generating, analysing and basing decisions on disaggregated data across various 
characteristics including gender, age, geographic location, ethnicity, health status, 
economic status etc. It is important that a reliable evidence base is developed to ensure 
that those who may be hard to reach are not denied access to human rights. Likewise, 
the substantive nature of the duty means taking additional positive steps to address 
systemic equality issues. For example, positive steps under CEDAW could involve a positive 
obligation to produce a strategy for increasing women’s participation in political life or 
funding initiatives to eliminate sexism in schools.40 A deep and rich human rights and 
equality evidence base is needed to improve our understanding of how law and policy can 
‘best address structural and societal power imbalances, while also encouraging greater 
equity and empowerment for society’s most disadvantaged members.’41 This requirement 
goes far beyond the legal obligations that exist domestically in the Equality Act 2010 that 
prohibits non-discrimination on the basis of different protected characteristics.
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6. What do we mean 
by ‘incorporation’?
Incorporation of ESC rights requires the domestic internalisation of international 
norms. This can occur through a variety of pathways or ‘ports’.42 As set out in diagram 1 
below, incorporation can occur by constitutionalising international standards (putting 
the rights into the constitution), through legislative or administrative adoption of 
international human rights norms, by signing up to an international complaints 
mechanism and complying with its decisions domestically or through a judicial 
approach to incorporation through the common law.43 These pathways form part 
of the various building blocks used in different constitutional models and they are 
not mutually exclusive – international human rights law can be embedded through 
these different ‘ports’ individually or concurrently. Different constitutional models are 
discussed in more detail below.
Diagram 1: Building blocks of incorporation
OPTION 4
Constitution
OPTION 3
International 
Complaints 
mechanism
OPTION 1
Legislation
OPTION 2
Common Law
ESC rights are not 
incorporated into 
Scottish law yet…
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As explained above, incorporation of international law into domestic law means 
embedding legal standards as set out in international law and making them enforceable 
at the domestic level. This is a requirement of a dualist state where international law is 
not automatically applicable when a state signs and ratifies a treaty. The state must go 
through a two-stage process of first, agreeing to the treaty at the international level and 
then second, embedding the treaty in domestic law to make it enforceable domestically. 
In so doing the state can take steps to internalise the international legal regime in a way 
that makes most sense in any particular given domestic context – there is therefore a 
degree of flexibility in the means of incorporation whether it be direct, indirect or on a 
piecemeal basis.44
Ultimately the test of effective implementation of human rights requires incorporation 
to reach a sufficient threshold including ensuring that the international normative 
content is not diluted or undermined and that an effective remedy is available for 
a violation. The degree of flexibility in a broad definition of incorporation is helpful 
in terms of ensuring that rights are able to flourish within the legal regime in which 
they are embedded. In so doing it is legitimate for the state to further elaborate and 
prescribe more fully the normative content of the right at a domestic level, using 
international law as a reference point and important tool for interpretation, whilst also 
leaving room for domestic law to go further than the international framework.
Essentially domestic incorporation of international norms should be both derived from 
and inspired by the international legal framework and should at all times be coupled 
with an effective remedy for a violation of a right. Remedies can also take on many 
different forms and this is discussed in more detail below.
11
Models of Incorporation and Justiciability for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
7. What do we mean 
by ‘justiciability’?
The legal status of ESC and the ‘justiciability’ of rights
Historically, the legal status of ESC rights has been misunderstood.45 This was based 
on confusion about how ESC rights should be implemented.46 As a result, subsequent 
measures to protect human rights, both at the regional and domestic level have 
erroneously focussed on CP rights and relegated ESC rights to aspirational rights, 
political goals or issues that depend solely on the legislature to accommodate.47 It has 
long been understood that CP rights are enforceable in the court, meaning they are 
‘justiciable’.48 When a state has incorporated CP rights into the constitutional framework 
it means that the courts can intervene to provide a remedy when the legislature or 
executive fail to uphold or comply. Now the literature and international best practice 
acknowledge that ESC rights are binding international legal standards and that they are 
amenable to judicial enforcement49.
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the body responsible for 
overseeing implementation of the ICESCR) has called for justiciable remedies50 for 
violations of ESC rights to be made available.51 The Committee also indicates that a 
blanket refusal to recognise the justiciable nature of ESC rights is considered arbitrary 
and that, ideally, ESC rights should be protected in the same way as CP rights within the 
domestic legal order.52 This means that states should explore how best to protect ESC 
rights within their own domestic framework.
It is now more commonly accepted in the literature and in practice that ESC rights 
can be judicially enforceable, or, that they ought to be – whereby effective remedies 
should be available for violations of ESC rights in the same way they are available for CP 
rights.53 Outstanding questions now relate as to how best to deliver justiciable remedies, 
or, through what mechanisms might ESC rights be best protected within a particular 
constitutional framework in a feasible and legitimate way.
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8. Can Scotland 
incorporate ESC Rights?
Does Scotland have competence to incorporate?
Under the terms of devolution the Scottish Parliament has the devolved competence to 
observe and implement international obligations in devolved areas.54 It is primarily the 
responsibility of the legislature to set out the way in which human rights law should be 
protected, including what role the executive and judiciary should play. Lord Brodie in 
the case of Whaley stated that ‘the Scottish Parliament has the power to legislate with 
the object of observing and implementing international obligations’ if it so chooses to 
do so.55
The United Nations human rights monitoring bodies have advised that the fulfilment 
of human rights requires states to take action at the domestic level in order to create 
the necessary legal structures, processes and substantive outcomes for human rights 
protection. Several UN Committees have recommended that the UK both incorporates 
international human rights law as well ensure effective justiciable remedies are made 
available for non-compliance.56 For example, the UN Committee on the Rights of the 
Child suggests that fulfilment of international obligations should be secured through 
incorporation of international obligations57 and by ensuring effective remedies, 
including justiciable remedies are made available domestically.58
In the context of devolution the Committee further suggests that any process of 
devolution must ensure that devolved authorities have the necessary financial, human 
and other resources effectively to discharge responsibilities for the implementation of 
international human rights law.59 The UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing has 
called for increased engagement in complying with ESC rights at the devolved level and 
highlighted that the effective application of rights at the local and subnational levels is 
critical for enhanced accountability at the devolved level.60
It would not be unusual comparatively speaking for Scotland as a devolved nation to 
take the lead as a duty bearer fulfilling the state’s international obligations in respect of 
the devolved areas it has responsibility for governing. There are examples of devolved 
legislatures where primary responsibility for the observance of international human 
rights law rests with the devolved legislature, such as in Switzerland, where international 
obligations are the responsibility of cantonal legislatures.61 In some instances the 
cantonal legislatures introduce more robust human rights mechanisms than at the 
confederal state level.62 Likewise, in Argentina, both the federal (national) state and 
provincial (devolved) states have directly incorporated international human rights 
treaties into their constitutions and both federal and provincial courts are responsible 
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for enforcing them.63 In the USA, San Francisco has partially incorporated the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
at a city and council level.64 In Canada, there are national, provincial and territorial laws 
protecting human rights.65 Scotland could take steps to benchmark the implementation 
of rights in devolved areas against international standards. In this sense it would be 
setting an example of best practice for other UK jurisdictions to follow.
In Scotland accountability at the devolved level is critically important because ESC 
rights engage with so many devolved competencies:
Diagram 2: ESC Rights Directly Engaging with Devolved Powers
International Human Rights
Right to 
Health
Right to 
Education
Right to 
Adequate 
Housing
Right to 
Social 
Security
Right to 
Adequate 
Standard of 
Living
Right to 
Healthy 
Environment
Devolved Competence
Health Education Housing Social Security
Social 
Services Environment
Reserved areas
Of course, one of the barriers to full incorporation of international human rights law 
into domestic law as that it would not be possible for Scotland to take steps to fully 
implement international human rights law in reserved areas. This means restrictions 
are in place at the devolved level in relation to some of the reserved areas engaging 
with human rights including employment, trade, immigration, foreign affairs, national 
security, data protection, some areas of social security and equal opportunities.66 
The constitution itself is a reserved area67, as is the Human Rights Act 1998 and the 
Scotland Act 1998, meaning that any changes to these Acts is beyond the competence 
of the Scottish Parliament. The Scottish Parliament can legislate in devolved areas, and 
this includes ‘observing and implementing’ international human rights obligations in 
devolved areas. However, under the terms of devolution it is important to be aware that 
some areas remain the sole responsibility of the state and the UK Parliament.
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9. Comparative 
constitutional models
International human rights standards can be incorporated into domestic law through 
many different models some of which are explored here. Scotland, and the UK, can learn 
lessons from these comparative models. Some countries have directly incorporated ESC 
rights into their written constitution.68 In Scotland and the UK the constitution is not 
written down in one text but comprises of many different sources of law, including in 
some cases statutes that take on constitutional significance, such as the Human Rights 
Act 1998, the Equality Act 1998 and the Scotland Act 1998. An imaginative approach to 
constitutional models means thinking beyond the traditional single source constitutional 
text when considering the best approach in Scotland’s unique devolved constitutional 
arrangement. The models discussed below include consideration of the roles of the 
different institutions of government – the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. 
This is a multi-institutional approach to ESC rights that recognises the importance of 
engaging each branch of government in decisions impacting on ESC rights.
Diagram 3: Constitutional building blocks
Judiciary Legislature
Executive
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The following tables contain sample constitutional models that demonstrate the 
different approaches to incorporation of international human rights law as well as the 
different judicial mechanisms used to enforce it. The constitutional models can differ 
significantly across countries and so too do the mechanisms which ensure access to a 
remedy. This means we see a broad range of constitutional guarantees coupled with a 
wide variety of different approaches adopted by courts in protecting those constitutional 
guarantees. The approaches that courts take are important because it gives us insight 
into the different types of ‘justiciability’ available (adjudication by a court).
Justiciability mechanisms can offer different degrees of enforcement – sometimes 
courts are very reluctant to interfere with guaranteeing rights (they are deferential 
to parliament/government) and other times the court will take significant steps in 
protecting rights (they uphold the constitution and act as the guarantor of human rights). 
Each of these approaches is discussed below. Ultimately it is for each state to create the 
legal structures and implementation mechanisms to effectively provide for human rights. 
At a basic level however it is important to remember that normally there requires to be 
some form of legal structure in place, a process that leads to a human rights compatible 
outcome and a remedy available should the structure or process fall short.
Argentina
The Argentinian Constitution was amended in 1994 and a number of international 
treaties were explicitly incorporated into the Constitution, including the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.69 This is a ‘rights affirmative’ 
constitutional framework where the compliance with international human rights and 
constitutional rights is the default position, which, can be denounced by the executive 
if two thirds of each chamber of the parliament approve (creating a rights-affirmative 
framework with the option for parliamentary derogation).70 The distribution of powers 
in Argentina is separated into both federal and provincial autonomy (national and 
devolved). In addition to the changes to the national constitution there were also a 
number of changes at the provincial level with individual states adopting constitutional 
amendments with better protection for ESC rights.
Finland
In Finland ESC rights receive constitutional protection. The constitutional provisions 
dealing with ESC rights in the Finnish model are directed at the legislature: the right to 
citizenship (Article 5); the right to equality before the law (Article 6); educational rights 
(Article 16); the right to language and culture (Article 17); the right to work (Article 18); 
and the right to social security (Article 19) are all required to be given effect to through 
subsequent legislation.71 The constitutional mandate to fulfil the ESC obligations is 
therefore directly addressed to the legislature. In this sense, the constitution imposes 
a mandatory obligation on the legislature to legislate for the protection and fulfilment 
of ESC rights. This model is therefore consonant with the doctrine of parliamentary 
supremacy but with the caveat that if the legislature fails to meet its constitutional 
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obligations the court can intervene. In Sweden a similar pre-enactment review process 
is in place. It is argued that that this type of ex ante review of legislation through the 
Parliamentary system makes it difficult (although not impossible) to legislate in a way 
that infringes fundamental rights.72 The court, however, ought to be available as a 
means of last resort to ensure executive and legislative compliance.73 The UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has raised concerns that the Finish and Swedish 
constitutional arrangements do not adequately facilitate access to justiciable remedies 
for violations of ESC rights potentially meaning that ex post judicial review is not yet 
sufficiently developed.74
Switzerland
In Switzerland the default position is that responsibility to implement international 
obligations is at cantonal level.75 It is therefore the responsibility of the devolved 
legislatures to implement international human rights law, including ESC rights. Some 
cantons go further than the federal level in introducing more extensive human rights 
protections.76 However, as with Sweden and Finland the UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has raised concerns that some provisions of ICESCR cannot be 
directly invoked before the courts in Switzerland creating an accountability gap in terms 
of justiciable remedies.77
Colombia
The Constitution divides human rights into three groups: fundamental rights, ESC 
rights and collective and environmental rights (chapters 1, 2 and 3). The Constitution 
also places international treaties on a domestic constitutional footing (articles 44 and 
93). The ESC rights included in the constitution relate to health, housing, work and 
education, among others. The Constitution also protects vulnerable and disadvantaged 
groups within society with particular measures for children, women, the elderly and 
disabled people (articles 46-47). Responsibility for safeguarding the Constitution is 
assigned to the Constitutional Court (article 241). As a result, there has been a ‘profound 
change’ in the legal culture of the country with considerable advancements made in the 
judicial enforcement of ESC rights.78
The main mechanism for the judicial protection under the constitution is the tutela 
device (article 86). The tutela enables a person to file a writ of protection before any 
court or tribunal for the immediate protection of her or his ‘fundamental constitutional 
rights.’ All decisions by ordinary judges on a writ of protection are sent to the 
Constitutional Court and are susceptible to review. Magistrates in the Constitutional 
Court can review tutelas, and where appropriate, will group cases together in order to 
address structural problems such as for example if an issue emerges that applies to a 
large group of vulnerable people the cases will be merged together and the court will 
issue a collective remedy.
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Germany
In Germany human rights take on constitutional status. Constitutional rights do not 
include all economic and social rights, however the constitution does provide for a 
right to dignity (Article 1.1 Basic Law) that the court has interpreted as constituting 
minimum standards (existenzminimum) across particular social rights.79 Governance 
responsibilities are divided between the federal level (Bund) and the devolved 
level (Länder) including compliance with human rights obligations.80 The court has 
interpreted the constitution to include minimum obligations in the context of ESC 
rights.81
South Africa
The South African model also adopts a mixture of substantive rights recognition, 
together with safeguards and limitation clauses contained in the Constitution. Rights 
are also afforded protection to different degrees along the respect, protect, promote, 
fulfil axis.82 Some ‘negative’ rights enjoy immediate protection such as the right not to be 
evicted without fair procedure.83 Some rights are afforded non-derogable status, such 
as rights relating to children.84 Other rights are considered to be subject to progressive 
realisation such as the right to access adequate housing and the right to access 
health care, food, water and social security.85 There is a general limitation clause under 
section 36 whereby rights may be limited if reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society.86 The South African Constitutional Court has adjudicated upon and 
enforced ESC rights employing a ‘reasonableness’ review in assessing state compliance.
Sweden
Sweden has recently taken a significant step in partially incorporating the UN 
Convention of the Rights of the Child into domestic law.87 The legislation passed in June 
2018 will come into force in January 2020. The new UNCRC Act clarifies that courts and 
legal practitioners must “consider the rights contained in the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and that [t]he rights of the child must be considered in deliberations and 
assessments made in decision-making processes in cases and matters that concern 
children.”88 It is not yet clear to what degree UNCRC rights will be enforceable by the 
court. There is a tripartite process underway where the UNCRC implementation process 
will be supported through capacity building, a legal audit of where change is required 
to comply with the UNCRC (mapping the gaps and how to address them) and the 
development of extensive guidance to assist decision makers in compliance once the 
UNCRC is incorporated.
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10. Role of the Legislature 
Enforcing Human Rights
The legislature can play one of the most significant roles in ensuring that ESC rights are 
incorporated and enforced, including by designing and delivering legislation which sets 
out ESC rights as legal standards. In addition, the legislature can play an important role 
as an accountability mechanism in the review of legislation before it is passed to ensure 
that it is compliant with ESC rights. The Finish legislative model demonstrates how the 
Parliament can act as an important accountability mechanism and guarantor of human 
rights by conducting pre-legislative scrutiny:
Legislative Models and Pre-legislative Scrutiny
Case Example: Finland
Under the Finish constitution there is a process of pre-legislative scrutiny 
that ensures any legislation passed by Parliament is fully compatible with 
constitutional rights, including ESC rights. This is a ‘rights-affirmative’ 
constitutional framework that operates on a presumption in favour of human 
rights compatibility rather than an ad hoc approach.91 This constitutional model 
imposes a duty on the legislature to introduce legislation to fulfil the right. 
There is only a limited role for the court which can review legislation if it is found 
that it does not comply with the constitution.92
The Constitutional Law Committee makes its decision on the compatibility of 
legislation after listening to constitutional and human rights experts. These 
decisions are not politically motivated but based on legal standards. The 
decisions of the Committee are not binding on Parliament but are considered to 
carry sufficient weight that by convention Parliament complies with them.
However, this review is reactive rather than proactive. For example, when parliament 
was reforming welfare legislation in 2003 the CLC declared the already in force 
provisions of the ‘partial labour market subsidy’ unconstitutional (those living with 
parents received only 60% of unemployment benefit). The provisions had formed 
part of the welfare state before the constitution was revised in 1995. It was not until 
the provisions came before the CLC under the 2003 reform that the constitutionality 
of the existing legislation to be retained was scrutinised. The subsidy was 
transformed in to a means tested subsidy in order to comply with ILO Convention 
168 on Employment Promotion and Protection against Unemployment.93
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In Scotland, there is ex ante (pre-legislative) review of human rights in the 
Scottish Parliament to some extent (in accordance with the Scotland Act 1998).94 
This occurs through non-disclosed assessments by the Executive and the 
Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament before legislation is passed. There 
is a requirement for the relevant Minster and the Presiding Officer to make a 
statement of compatibility in relation to each Bill being considered. However 
these limited reviews do not take the full body of international human rights 
law into consideration meaning that ESC rights, for example, are not regularly 
reviewed as part of the pre-legislative process. The recently expanded remit of 
the Equality and Human Rights Committee (EHRiC) could be expanded further 
to include ESC rights. There would be scope for broadening the current pre-
legislative scrutiny arrangements in order to ensure that all human rights are 
being taken into consideration across parliamentary business, by the EHRiC 
and by other committees. Effective human rights scrutiny by committees is a 
particularly important aspect of accountability in the parliament because the 
legislature is unicameral.
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights and 
the Inter-Parliamentary Union has recommended that ‘[h]uman rights should 
thoroughly permeate parliamentary activity’.95 Ideally the Scottish Parliament 
EHRiC should work towards supporting the other Committees to engage with 
international human right norms as part of their remit through an awareness 
raising campaign and the adoption of additional resources managed by the 
Committee such as cross-parliamentary ‘Human Rights Rapporteurs’.96
A renewed remit for the EHRiC would require sufficient support and 
resources. Ex-ante review could be supported by a panel of human rights 
and constitutional experts (including expertise on ESC rights). Compatibility 
decisions of the EHRiC and the expert advice received could be published to 
ensure transparency. The decisions of the Committee may not necessarily be 
binding but should carry sufficient weight in guiding the legislature on human 
rights compliance.
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11. Role of the 
Court Enforcing ESC Rights
The court is the accountability mechanism that can offer an effective remedy for 
a violation of ESC rights if the legislature and executive have failed to comply. ESC 
adjudication and the legal enforcement of rights can occur through a ‘myriad of forms’ 
some of which offer greater protection than others.97 The tables below set out some of 
the comparative case law to demonstrate the different ways that the court approaches 
the enforcement of ESC rights to different degrees.
Comparative Case Law Analysis
Case Example: Germany
The German constitution recognises the right to human dignity.98 Whilst there 
is no specific or explicit guarantee to far reaching ESC rights the courts have 
interpreted the right to human dignity as requiring a minimum level of social 
assistance. In the Hartz IV case the German constitutional court found that 
there is a ‘fundamental right to the guarantee of a subsistence minimum that 
is in line with human dignity.’99 This is an example of ‘human dignity’ providing 
the threshold for assessing compliance with the right to social security. The 
court declared the social security system unlawful when it failed to comply 
with the right to human dignity and when the means of calculating minimum 
subsistence (existenzminimum) were fundamentally flawed. The court found 
that, ‘It is the socio‐economic right of every needy person to be provided, via 
statutory law, with material conditions that are indispensable for his or her 
physical existence and for a minimum participation in social, cultural, and 
political life.’100
The Hartz IV case in Germany has provided a transformative and innovative 
approach to the right to social security that sets out a substantive standard as 
well as a procedural right. The court directly referenced Germany’s obligation 
to comply with Article 9 ICESCR when assessing the minimum subsistence in 
a subsequent case dealing with asylum seekers.101 This could be compared 
with the weaker constitutional approach where justiciability assesses whether 
the legislature has provided a statutory scheme for social security rather than 
supervise the threshold met or the means of calculating a minimum level. In 
Hungary for example, the court has adjudicated on the right to social security 
but only so far as to determine whether a system has been implemented 
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rather than examine the adequacy of the system itself.103 This approach is 
more closely aligned with the UK and potentially Scotland – where even if the 
legislative scheme is available, accessible and affordable – it may not necessarily 
be benchmarked against an appropriate threshold or standard in terms of its 
adequacy.
The Hartz IV decision stresses that there is a fundamental guarantee to 
a constitutional minimum that covers the material conditions that are 
indispensable for a person’s physical existence (for example, housing, food, 
and clothing), for a minimum participation in human interaction (for example, 
telephone costs), and for a minimum participation in social, cultural, and 
political life (for example, membership in sport clubs, and going to the 
cinema)’.104
In Scotland the Hartz IV adjudication helps to demonstrate how the 
determination of entitlement (section 19 of the Social Security (Scotland) Act 
2018) could be measured against human rights standards to ensure that the 
level of subsistence available is compatible with human rights and human 
dignity. In the first instance this would place a duty on the state, or any public 
or private body acting on its behalf, to implement a process for defining 
entitlement in a human rights compatible way (a procedural duty) as well as 
ensuring that this process should result in an outcome meaning that no person 
faces living in destitution (a substantive duty). This could also involve providing 
the courts with a role to supervise whether the legislature and/ or executive 
are enacting a social security scheme that employs a methodological approach 
that ensures minimum levels of subsistence across the devolved areas in an 
inclusive way. The proposed Scottish Social Security Commission could play an 
important role in assessing this – however, if the legislature fails to respond to 
the Commission’s recommendations then, in order to ensure accountability, a 
remedy should be made available – this would require a role for the court. For 
example, if the Scottish social security scheme used incorrect data or a flawed 
methodology to calculate entitlement there should be a remedy available to 
the applicant to challenge this and the court could order that the method be 
corrected/ improved. This is a remedy which results in the right to a process for 
determining a substantive threshold. The adjudication in Germany maintained a 
strong deferential role to parliament and a wide margin of appreciation in terms 
of how best to approach and deliver the social security scheme.105 Rather than 
view the court as usurping the role of the legislature it might be helpful to think 
of adjudication as an institutional dialogue – where the court can order the 
legislature or executive to ‘rethink’ a flawed policy without necessarily declaring 
it void.106
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Case Example: Colombia
The tutela device107 is a fast track remedial process whereby applicants can seek 
to enforce constitutional rights, including ESC rights, if they require immediate 
protection. In the context of social security the Colombian Constitutional 
Court has developed the concept of mínimo vital (based on the German 
existenz minimum). Although the mínimo vital is not explicitly mentioned in the 
constitution it has been interpreted as implicit to the right to life, the right to 
health, the right to work and the right to social security.108 As explained, ‘in cases 
of extreme urgency in which the basic subsistence of the individual and her 
family is in jeopardy, it is possible to file a writ of protection [acion tutela] as a 
fast-track emergency measure for the enforcement of ESC rights.’109
The courts have intervened to ensure that those in desperate need have 
access to a remedy as quickly as possible. For example, an elderly man living 
in absolute poverty requested that the state provide him with economic 
assistance so that he could undergo an eye operation that would allow him to 
recover his sight. The court found that the legislature had not complied with 
its duty to adopt a law to address the situation of such persons and ordered 
the social security system to provide the treatment.110 In another case a poor 
elderly man who had not received a State subsidy was given access to a remedy 
because when he had initially applied he had been told the wrong information 
from the relevant administrative authority about the procedures necessary 
to obtain his benefit.111 The tutela device cannot be used if there are other 
procedures available to remedy the situation – it is essentially a last resort in 
the case of absolute emergencies. For example, if the minimum conditions for a 
dignified life of a mother and new born depends on the payment of maternity 
benefits this right becomes a fundamental right that is immediately enforceable 
under the tutela device.112 However, if the need is not immediate and there are 
other means of seeking a remedy then the tutela will not be necessary.
In 2004 the court combined 1,150 tutela cases of internally displaced people 
(IDP) and issued a structural remedy113 in three parts:
‘First, it mandated that the government formulate a coherent plan of 
action to tackle the IDPs’ humanitarian emergency and to overcome the 
unconstitutional state of affairs. Second, it ordered the administration 
to calculate the budget that was needed to implement such a plan of 
action and to explore all possible avenues to actually invest the amount 
calculated on programs for IDPs. Third, it instructed the government to 
guarantee the protection of at least the survival-level content (mínimo 
vital) of the most basic rights—food, education, health care, land, and 
housing. All of these orders were directed to all relevant public agencies, 
including national governmental entities and local authorities.’114
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This could be compared with the type of adjudication in Scotland that saw a 
broad based approach to human rights violations such as addressing slopping 
out in prisons (in order to ensure compliance with Article 3 ECHR)115 or ensuring 
access to a solicitor in the police station (in order to ensure compliance with 
Article 6 ECHR)116. In these cases Scottish legislature, executive and judiciary 
have already developed and demonstrated capacity to deal with structural 
remedies for systemic human rights violations under the existing terms of 
devolution. Since 1997 the Colombian Constitutional Court has handed down 
structural remedies in relation to the social security system,117 massive prison 
overcrowding,118 lack of protection for human rights defenders,119 and failures in 
the health care system.120
In Scotland, a similar approach to fast track ‘tutelas’ and potential structural 
remedies could be rolled out as part of access to justice enhancements. 
For example, the tribunal system, could potentially be utilised as a route to 
accessing a remedy in accordance with international human rights law in areas 
relating to housing, health or social security. This would require the tribunals to 
approach statutory duties in accordance with international human rights law in 
a way that does not currently feature as part of the existing inquisitorial tribunal 
process.
For example, in the case of social security it could require the social entitlement 
tribunal to play a role in interpreting what is required to meet a minimum 
according to international human rights law rather than solely rely on the 
domestic statutory regime for a definition (because the statutory regime may 
result in entitlements that do not meet the basic needs for human dignity). On 
the other hand, it could require the tribunal to consider whether a policy or a 
means of calculating entitlement is sufficiently robust to ensure human rights 
compatibility.
If the tribunal system encounters numerous cases where the same issues 
reappear and it appears the problem is more systemic court procedures could 
be developed so that the issue could be referred to the Court of Session to 
make a determination on a group of collective cases. The higher court could 
therefore take on a role similar to the Colombian Constitutional Court by issuing 
a structural remedy that aims to address the structural, or systemic issue, that 
has arisen under multiple ‘tutela’ style tribunal cases (this is discussed in more 
detail below).
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Case Example: Argentina
In Argentina, international human rights law has been directly incorporated into 
the national (Article 25) and subnational constitutions. Several cases have seen 
ESC rights enforced through the judiciary with reference to these international 
standards. For example, in Saavedra the court referenced UN Committee on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights General Comments 4 and 7 in interpreting 
the right to housing.121 In Gianelli a trial court declared that if tenants with 
children were threatened with forced eviction the government authority must 
assure alternative housing.122 In Delfino123 the court considered the conditions 
of government funded private hostels did not meet habitability conditions 
and ordered the city administration to adopt measures to provide adequate 
housing – the courts also imposed fines on public officials for failing to comply 
with a court agreement that involved ensuring adequate housing conditions of 
a number of families included in an emergency housing plan.124
The court in Argentina has also gone so far as to offer structural remedies where 
the local authority has failed in implementing ESC rights, such as the right 
to housing. This has included wide ranging structural remedies for collective 
cases involving multiple families (like a class action). In Agüero a collective 
injunction involved 86 families living in irregular conditions on state-owned 
land.125 Initially the case was settled and the administration agreed to design 
a specific housing plan for the families – the administration’s failure to comply 
led to a new injunction and to a court ordered seizure of public monies to 
secure funding for the promised plan. The administration adopted a plan to 
build 91 dwellings giving priority in the legal tender to enterprises offering 
jobs to residents. The administration was to offer residents access to a special 
line of credit where payments were not to exceed 20% of monthly income. This 
structural approach ensured budget, policy and outcome were all embedded in 
international human rights law.
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Case Example: South Africa
The jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of South Africa employs 
reasonableness as the means through which to assess constitutional 
compatibility as initially set out in the Grootboom126 case. This case related to 
an application made under sections 26 and 28 of the Constitution in relation 
to the right to access adequate housing and the rights of children to shelter 
respectively. Mrs Grootboom and 899 others had been living in poor conditions 
in an informal settlement. They then illegally occupied nearby private land 
designated for low-cost housing and were forcibly evicted. Their shacks were 
bulldozed and burnt and their possessions destroyed. Following an interim 
order issued by the High Court in favour of Mrs Grootboom and the other 
respondents the state lodged an appeal with the Constitutional Court. A further 
intermediary solution was sought between the parties, however, the state failed 
to adhere to the agreed terms. An urgent application was thereafter made to 
the Constitutional Court and the court made a declaratory order. The order 
required the state to act to meet the obligation imposed upon it by section 
26(2) of the Constitution (the progressive realisation of the right to housing). 
This included the obligation to devise, fund, implement and supervise measures 
to provide relief to those in desperate need. The court assigned responsibility to 
the Human Rights Commission under section 184 of the Constitution to monitor 
compliance with the declaratory order.
In the unanimous judgment issued by Justice Yacoob the court reaffirmed the 
justiciable nature of ESC rights as enshrined in the Constitution and confirmed 
in the Certification Judgment.127 The court identified that the difficulty in giving 
substance to the ESC rights in the constitution related to how best to enforce 
the rights in any given case:
Socio-economic rights are expressly included in the Bill of Rights; they 
cannot be said to exist on paper only. Section 7(2) of the Constitution 
requires the state “to respect, protect, promote and fulfill the rights in 
the Bill of Rights” and the courts are constitutionally bound to ensure 
that they are protected and fulfilled. The question is therefore not 
whether socio-economic rights are justiciable under our Constitution, 
but how to enforce them in a given case. This is a very difficult issue 
which must be carefully explored on a case-by-case basis.128
The judgment in Grootboom set out the reasonableness test as the standard 
of review in ESC adjudication. In this case, the state had not gone far enough 
to meet the needs of those in desperate need of housing, and, as a result had 
acted unreasonably. The court ordered the state to revisit its housing strategy 
and introduce a new policy that reflected its constitutional obligation to 
provide adequate housing. In this case the right to housing was not immediate 
enforceable but the state was under an obligation to adopt a policy to ensure 
that short and long term measures were in place to realise the right to housing.
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12. What justiciability 
building blocks would 
Scotland need?
Innovative judicial remedies can occur in a constitutionally legitimate manner in ESC 
adjudication. Of course, there is still wide scope for deference to Parliament in the 
determination of rights; however, this could be one of many routes open to the judiciary 
in a variety of innovative remedies for ESC rights. Courts are well equipped to deal 
with difficult and complex legal issues with socio-economic implications. As Wolffe has 
highlighted, prior to his appointment as Lord Advocate:
“Courts are… generally acutely conscious of the limitations of their competence, of 
the democratic legitimacy which attends policymaking by Parliament and by an 
executive accountable to Parliament, and of the subsidiary and limited role which 
the Courts may accordingly properly play in checking executive and legislative 
action. It does not follow that the Courts can or should play no role. We might 
not wish the Courts to decide which is the best means of securing progressive 
implementation of economic or social rights; but we might, at the same time, 
decide that it would be useful to allow them, for example, to adjudicate on whether 
the government has addressed itself to the question of how best to secure that 
progressive implementation, and whether or not, in doing so, it has discriminated 
in a manner incompatible with the Covenant. The question of whether the Courts 
should be given that role – or any other role in relation to economic and social 
rights – seems to me, ultimately, to be a political or constitutional question, not a 
conceptual one.”129
Courts can employ a variety of different types of judicial review in the determination 
of ESC rights including reasonableness, legality, proportionality, procedural fairness, 
and even what has been termed “anxious scrutiny” meaning the court will step up the 
intensity of review when considering a decision that impacts on fundamental rights. 
Courts are also well equipped to develop innovative remedies in order to identify the 
most appropriate way of determining a case.130
Here we consider the ‘building blocks of justiciability’ and what kind of issues require to 
be taken into consideration when creating a framework for ESC rights adjudication.
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Diagram 4: Building blocks of justiciability
Building block: Access to Court
Standing as an individual applicant
In Scotland an individual must be able to establish ‘sufficient interest’ in order to be 
able to seek judicial review of a decision.131 In addition, when the case engages with 
human rights under the ECHR then the applicant must also establish victimhood.132 For 
those who require to seek legal aid the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986 sets out eligibility 
criteria including whether the Board is satisfied that the applicant has sufficient grounds 
for commencing legal action and whether it appears to the Scottish Legal Aid Board 
(SLAB) that it is reasonable in the particular circumstances of the case that the applicant 
should receive legal aid.133 The subjective test of reasonableness by SLAB could result 
in some applicants struggling to secure the financial resources required to take a case 
– this would be particularly problematic in the sphere of ESC rights where the litigation 
culture is in its infancy. SLAB may, for example, examine the likely costs of any case and 
balance these against the benefit an applicant will get from the proceedings.134 Judicial 
review can be expensive, and should only be used as a means of last resort. In addition, 
when claiming ESC rights the financial implications may not necessarily be addressed 
as sufficiently significant in financial terms for support to be provided by SLAB. A 
justice system that facilitates access to remedies for violations of ESC rights cannot be 
based on balancing whether or not the outcome will be of sufficient financial gain for 
the applicant, particularly when dealing with access to basic services such as welfare, 
housing or educational provision. This would suggest that the current restrictions on 
access to legal aid may require to be given careful consideration in order to facilitate ESC 
justiciability and access to an effective remedy for a violation of an ESC right.
Remedy
Intensity of 
review
Degree of 
enforcement
Multi-party 
actions
Grounds for 
review
Access to 
court
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Further restrictions can apply in the context of securing legal aid when a where a 
number of people have the same interest in the case. Civil Legal Aid will not be provided 
to more than one individual unless it can be shown that that individual will suffer 
serious prejudice.135 This means that even where access to group litigation, or collective 
complaints, is facilitated, such as under the Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group 
Proceedings) (Scotland) Act 2018 – full access will also require to be reflected in the 
rules around legal aid eligibility if access to justice is to be facilitated in practice.
Standing in public interest litigation
Public interest litigation has not been widely used in either the UK or in Scotland as a 
means of challenging societal issues on a wide scale basis.136 Historically public interest 
litigation was not allowed in the UK and, although English courts began to hear interest 
group cases, this did not necessarily trickle down to devolved jurisdictions.137 Holding 
the executive to account by means of judicial review has largely been based on a private 
rights model with a preference on focussing on individual concerns on a case by case 
basis.138
The expansion of standing in Scotland in 2012 was intended to facilitate access to 
public interest litigation and enhance the protection of rights beyond the private rights 
model.139 However, when engaging with ECHR rights eligibility is still restricted by the 
victim test under the Scotland Act 1998 (section 100) and the Human Rights Act 1998 
(section 7). This can make it difficult to establish standing in public interest litigation. 
Seeking judicial review in a public interest challenge should allow litigants to raise a 
public law issue which is of general importance even if the claimant has no private 
interest in the outcome of the case.140 The additional threshold of establishing victim 
status in connection with an ECHR breach means that there is a restrictive interpretation 
of standing for those who might wish to intervene on behalf of large groups.141 This may 
well undermine the justiciability of both CP and ESC rights because it may not always 
be possible for cases to be brought by individuals who meet the eligibility criteria in 
order to take a case. For example, if a housing charity wishes to raise a public interest 
litigation case on behalf of social housing tenants the restrictive application of standing 
in Scotland may mean that they cannot take a case based on Convention rights. If the 
enforcement of human rights is to extend to ESC rights then the tests for establishing 
standing should be expanded to ensure public interest cases are actionable.
Building block: Multi-party actions
Collective litigation
Collective litigation is another means of challenging a breach of human rights where a 
group of individuals take a collective group case against the state (also known as a class 
action or a multi-party action). Collective litigation has proved successful in dealing 
with systemic human rights violations under the Colombian tutela system where the 
court can group together cases in order to issue a structural remedy. The Colombian 
Constitutional Court has heard and decided ‘structural’ cases where it considers whether 
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an ‘unconstitutional set of affairs’ requires to be remedied.142 Usually this will involve 
multiple applicants (collective cases) and will allow the court to review whether the 
state can remedy a systemic problem engaging multiple stakeholders and multiple 
defendants.
These type of structural cases tend to:
(1) affect a large number of people who allege a violation of their rights, either 
directly or through organisations that litigate the cause;
(2) implicate multiple government agencies found to be responsible for 
pervasive public policy failures that contribute to such rights violations; and
(3) involve structural injunctive remedies, i.e., enforcement orders whereby 
courts instruct various government agencies to take coordinated actions to 
protect the entire affected population and not just the specific complainants in 
the case.143
This could be compared with the type of adjudication in Scotland that saw a broad 
based approach to human rights violations such as addressing slopping out in prisons 
(in order to ensure compliance with Article 3 ECHR).144 The Scottish judiciary has 
already developed and demonstrated capacity to deal with systemic human rights 
violations. Nonetheless, remedies for systemic issues in the Scottish cases tends to 
favour compensation as a form of remedy rather than a structural injunction to correct 
a systemic issue. There may be more scope to explore the possibilities of viewing 
alternative remedies as part of a cultural shift in addressing ESC violations. If structural 
issues arise in relation to ESC rights it would not be beyond the reach of the legislature, 
executive and judiciary to work together to remedy the matter.145 For example, if a 
systemic problem arises in relation to human rights protection then there could be a 
role for the court to supervise whether the legislature and/or executive could take steps 
to remedy this through a form of structural injunction. Landau argues that addressing 
violations of social rights through a structural approach to remedies facilitates a form 
of social rights adjudication that positively impacts on the lives of poorer citizens and 
prioritises the most vulnerable.146
Traditionally multi-party actions have been addressed on ad hoc basis by identifying a 
lead case that can act as a test case and sisting (suspending) other cases while awaiting 
for the outcome of the lead case.147 Following suggested reform recommended in 
reports of both the Scottish Law Commission (1996)148 and the Scottish Civil Courts 
Review (2009)149 the Court of Session rules were amended to facilitate the adoption 
of new procedures for multi-party cases to be initiated at the direction of the Lord 
President allowing more flexibility for case management by the nominated judge (Rule 
2.2).150 Multi-party procedures have been facilitated under Rule 2.2 on a number of 
occasions to deal with systemic issues, including claims under the Damages (Asbestos-
related Conditions) (Scotland) Act 2009151 and in response personal injury actions 
relating to the use of vaginal tape and mesh.152 Rule 2.2 may offer a potential route to 
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remedy for multi-party cases as part of a cultural shift in human rights adjudication 
around systemic ESC violations.
Further reform under the Civil Litigation (Expenses and Group Proceedings) (Scotland) 
Act 2018 will provide for group litigation in the Court of Session. Further detail on the 
group procedure for judicial review will be set out in new rules of court to be developed 
by the Scottish Civil Justice Council.153 Again, there is more scope for exploring the 
possibilities that multi-party actions or group cases can provide in terms of dealing 
with systemic ESC rights violations. Comparative experience indicates that courts must 
adapt procedures to deal with systemic ESC rights violations by facilitating access to a 
collective procedure with multiple stakeholders, multiple defenders and through the 
deployment of structural remedies.154
Outstanding issues relate to those cases which do not necessarily fall within the existing 
court procedures or scope of the 2018 Act. For example, should it become clear that a 
number of cases are emerging at tribunal level new procedures might be considered 
to group the cases and ‘refer up’ to the Court of Session, or for the possibility to confer 
powers at the Tribunal level to hear systemic issues by using a multi-party approach 
(for example, where a systemic issue arises in the Housing and Property Chamber of 
the First Tier Tribunal (for private rental sector)). Likewise, similar consideration must be 
given to cases arising in the Sheriff Court and what procedures can be used to facilitate 
multi-party action or grouping of cases when systemic issues arise, such as in relation to 
complaints on social housing provision currently within the domain of the Sheriff Court.
Building block: Grounds for Review
Expanding grounds for review
ESC rights can be adjudicated upon under each of the grounds of review in the same 
way as CP rights. Grounds of review tend to be classified under a threefold division155: 
illegality (unlawfulness), irrationality (unreasonableness) and procedural impropriety 
(unfairness). Depending on whether the ground is procedural (procedural impropriety) 
or substantive (unlawful/ unreasonable) will determine what type of review the court 
will apply. The grounds for review are not intended to be exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive.156 This means, for example that a case could be examined on the grounds that 
it is potentially unlawful, unreasonable and unfair, as well as on other potential grounds 
that might emerge in the future.
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Table 4: Grounds for review
Ground of review What does this mean? What kind of review might 
be employed?
Illegality Was the decision lawful? A court will look at whether 
the decision is within the 
power of the decision or 
whether it is ultra vires 
(outwith the power of the 
decision maker). This is a 
substantive form of review 
that goes beyond looking at 
fair process.
Irrationality Was the decision 
reasonable?
A court will look at the 
decision making process 
and assess whether the 
outcome of the process was 
reasonable.
Procedural Impropriety Did the decision maker 
follow the correct 
procedural rules when 
making the decision?
The court will look at the 
fairness of the decision 
making process and the type 
of review will be concerned 
with the procedural aspects 
of the decision.
Building block: Intensity of Review
Depending on the grounds for review the court can employ different types of review in 
the determination of ESC rights including reasonableness, proportionality, procedural 
fairness and even anxious scrutiny. Each of the types of review can vary in intensity. 
Likewise, sometimes various forms of review can be used at the same time, including 
both procedural and substantive aspects. There is scope for the court to continue to 
develop the intensity of review in different types of cases. Courts could, for example, 
develop review techniques that also examine the fairness of the outcome of a decision 
and its compatibility with rights similar to the approach adopted in the Hartz IV case in 
Germany (discussed above). This type of review, while in its infancy in the UK, is evident 
in cases such as UNISON157, where the court considered evidence on what constituted 
a social minimum when considering the fairness of tribunal fees, or in the case of RF 
where the court considered the lack of empirical evidence to justify a policy unlawful.158 
This type of review is categorised below as substantive unfairness.159
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Table 5: Intensity of Review
Intensity of Review Definition – what must the judiciary ask itself?
Reasonableness Was the decision making process reasonable and 
rational? If not, would no other sensible person 
applying logic have arrived at the same outcome?
Proportionality In the context of human rights decisions, was the 
decision the most proportionate way to achieve a 
legitimate aim when balancing out the alternatives 
and taking into account the necessity of the action?
Procedural Fairness Did the decision making process follow due process, 
was it fair? Were all of the decision making procedures 
followed correctly?
Anxious Scrutiny160 In the context of fundamental rights decisions, does 
the particular area and severity of the decision merit 
the judiciary taking a closer look at the substantive and 
procedural aspects of the case?
Substantive Unfairness161 Over and above whether the process was fair, was 
the decision itself fair based on an independent 
examination of the evidence? Whilst this type of 
review is in its infancy162 there is potential for courts 
to develop review that takes into consideration the 
fairness of substantive outcomes in terms of rights 
compliance. In other words, over and above reviewing 
the decision making process or the power (vires) to 
make the decision, is the outcome itself compliant with 
ESC rights?
In relation to ESC rights it is particularly important to be aware of the difference 
between different types of review such as assessing the reasonableness of a decision 
compared to a more substantive form of review such as proportionality or substantive 
unfairness. For example, if an applicant challenges the provision of social security 
they may seek judicial review on grounds of reasonableness and the court will assess 
the applicant’s case based on whether or not the policy or decision relating to the 
provision of social welfare is ‘reasonable’. The threshold for unreasonableness is high in 
jurisprudence across the UK. Based on the well-developed reasonableness test an action 
(or omission) must be “so outrageous and in defiance of logic…that no sensible person 
who had applied his mind to the question … could have arrived at it”.163 This degree of 
review means that the onus of proving ‘unreasonableness’ rests with the applicant and 
that the court requires a high degree of ‘irrationality’ to find a matter unreasonable. 
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Whilst this works well in relation to some areas of human rights it may not be suitable 
or appropriate for all alleged violations. For example, there is a difference in challenging 
whether or not a long term policy is fit for purpose in the building of new houses or the 
immediate need of someone who is living in absolute destitution.
An expanded form of reasonableness review has been the type of review employed in 
South Africa ESC jurisprudence.164 In the context of ESC rights it has been understood as 
a right to a reasonable policy (p) to access a right (x).165 In other words the court assesses 
the process leading to a right [p(x)] rather than outcome of the process [(x)]. In the case 
of Grootboom, the court assessed the reasonableness of the housing policy in South 
Africa and determined that the state had not gone far enough in providing housing for 
those in desperate need thus acting unreasonably. The outcome was that the state was 
required to revisit its housing strategy (this did not provide an immediately enforceable 
right to Mrs Grootboom). Sometimes remedies may have no immediate material impact 
that results in transformative change for a particular applicant but that the longer term 
symbolism of the court’s interjection will create the space for broader societal change.166
This can be compared with a challenge to the provision of social security payments 
on the grounds that it is manifestly unfair. In this case the court would assess the 
substantive outcome of a policy or decision when determining whether the process 
leading to the outcome is substantively fair. As stated above, this approach is evident, 
for example, in the Hartz IV jurisprudence in the German Constitutional Court. The court 
adopted a hybrid approach to judicial review where they assessed the reasonableness 
of the policy as well as the fairness of the outcome. The court found that the process 
was flawed and that the outcome was unfair. The more substantive degree of review 
meant that the public body had to change the process as well as the outcome in order 
to comply with the court’s decision.
In terms of developing ESC adjudication courts may require to move beyond the 
traditional reasonableness review and develop other means of assessing human 
rights compliance. For example, this could manifest as a more thorough form of 
reasonableness review beyond ‘irrationality’ to encompass more substantive elements. 
The UN CESCR has for example developed reasonableness as a test that takes into 
consideration the following factors:
uu The extent to which the measures taken were deliberate, concrete and targeted 
towards the fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights.
uu Whether discretion was exercised in a non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary manner.
uu Whether resource allocation is in accordance with international human rights 
standards.
uu Whether the State party adopts the option that least restricts Covenant rights.
uu Whether the steps were taken within a reasonable timeframe.
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uu Whether the precarious situation of disadvantaged and marginalized individuals or 
groups has been addressed.
uu Whether policies have prioritised grave situations or situations of risk.
uu Whether decision-making is transparent and participatory.167
Similar consideration could be given for example to tests of proportionality, aspects of 
which are evident in the above expansive reasonableness test, and which allow a court 
to weigh up the different considerations a public body has had regard to in making 
a determination. Again this approach may not take into account whether or not the 
substantive outcome is unfair. Sometimes this type of review is the most appropriate 
but again, if the situation relates for example to a non-derogable component 
proportionality may not be enough. These different considerations all relate to what 
degree courts might enforce rights along the respect, protect, fulfil analogy.
Building block: Degree of Enforcement
Enforcement to varying degrees
The degree of enforcement of ESC rights is particularly important when determining 
whether the court is enforcing rights in a procedural sense or in a substantive 
one. There are various ways of viewing the different degrees of protection for ESC 
rights from negative (immediately enforceable) to positive (requiring action either 
immediately or progressively) or otherwise understood as responding to procedural 
v substantive obligations. Nolan et al identify degrees of enforcement through a 
multitude of varying degrees – from respect, to protect, to fulfil, consideration of 
progressive realisation and finally non-retrogressive measures.168 Courtis has expanded 
this theory to degrees of standard starting with negative, to procedural, through 
equality and non-discrimination, minimum core arguments, progressive realisation, 
and prohibiting retrogression.169 In South Africa the constitution sets out various 
degrees of enforcement through respect, protect, fulfil, promote. Each of the degrees 
of enforcement move from partial protection to full protection. This axis of protection is 
equally applicable to civil and political rights. Courts can therefore issue remedies that 
enforce CPESC rights to different degrees depending on the circumstances.
Diagram 5: Degrees of enforcement
Respect Protect Fulfil
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Building block: Remedy
Courts are also well equipped to develop innovative remedies in order to identify the 
most appropriate way of determining a case.170 In some instances courts may employ a 
variety of remedies to deal with different aspects of the same case, including declaratory 
orders, interpretative compliance outcomes, injunctions, structural interdicts, delayed 
remedies or interim relief with supervisory functions.
As discussed above it is important to note the difference between process and outcome 
remedies (or procedural v substantive enforcement of ESC rights). A process remedy will 
require Parliament or the Executive to revisit a process or policy, whereas, an outcome 
remedy will require Parliament or the Executive to revisit an actual outcome meaning 
substantive change. There are also distinctions to be drawn from the force of a remedy. 
For example, in Scotland under existing human rights law an applicant can seek an ultra 
vires remedy if the state has acted incompatibly with ECHR rights in a devolved area. 
This remedy has immediate effect rendering the incompatible act no longer law and in 
the case of devolved legislation affords the court a strike down power (the legislation 
is declared ultra vires and therefore unlawful). If the same applicant is dealing with an 
ECHR breach deriving from Westminster legislation then they may seek a declaration of 
incompatibility. This remedy does not have any effect on the incompatible legislation 
and does not affect its application – meaning the incompatible legislation is still 
law. These different remedial orders have different consequences for the applicant. 
Enhancing human rights protections by further embedding international law into the 
domestic regime would mean taking steps to develop innovative remedies in different 
scenarios. Here we consider existing remedies and how these might be developed in 
future when engaging with ESC rights.
Diagram 6: Developing innovative remedies
Ultra vires – damages or 
outcome orientated orders?
Structural injunctions 
and collective cases
Delayed remedies and 
multi-institutional dialogue
Exercising supervisory 
jurisdiction and follow up
Declarations of 
incompatibility – deferential
Developing 
innovative 
remedies
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Existing remedies available in judicial review actions
Reduction: This involves the court quashing the original decision and giving the 
issue back to the decision maker to look at again.
Declarator: An authoritative statement that an individual or body has a specific 
right or duty.
Suspension and interdict: An order for suspension stops something currently 
being done. An interdict is used to prevent a threatened wrong occurring or the 
continuance of current wrongdoing.
Specific performance or specific implement: the court orders the respondent 
to do something which they are under a legal duty to do.
Liberation: used where there has been wrongful or illegal imprisonment.
Interim orders: Interim orders, such as an interim interdict, can be applied for at 
the start of a case, pending a final decision as a temporary solution.
Damages financial compensation can be awarded in judicial review actions if 
there can be shown to be a ground entitling the petitioner to such an award by 
virtue of another specific part of the law (Convention rights/ EU law).
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Table 6: Classification of innovative approach to remedies171
Weak Moderate Strong
Ty
pe
 o
f d
ut
y 
(o
r o
bl
ig
at
io
n) Duty to consider rights 
in the decision making 
process (due regard)
Duty to design a 
rights-fulfilling policy 
(not necessarily 
resulting in a 
substantive outcome)
Duty to provide an 
rights compliant 
outcome
Ty
pe
 o
f E
nf
or
ce
m
en
t
Court will look at 
decision making process
Deference to Parliament/ 
Government to remedy 
incompatible legislation/
action/omission
Compliance left to 
discretion of decision 
makers
Court can outline 
procedures and broad 
goals
Criteria and deadlines 
for assessing progress
Decisions on means 
and policies left to 
government
Court can issue 
outcome-oriented 
orders
This could include 
development 
of outcome-
orientated 
structural interdicts 
in multi-party cases
Ty
pe
 o
f R
em
ed
y
Declaration of 
incompatibility – Hirst 
(no change in law – 
parliament could choose 
to ignore)
Due regard duty under 
the Equality Act 2010 – 
PSED requires to have 
due regard to equality of 
outcomes but does not 
include duty to ensure 
equality of outcomes
Ultra vires declaration 
in Napier (damages 
awarded which led to 
SG addressing issue in 
a substantive sense – a 
broad goal had been 
inadvertently set – the 
symbolic nature of the 
deferential judgment 
resulted in material 
change)
Reasonableness 
judgment in 
Grootboom (right to 
a reasonable housing 
strategy not an 
immediate right to a 
house)
Hartz IV (hybrid 
remedy – right to a 
reasonable process 
and the right to 
an outcome to 
meet threshold of 
dignity)
Structural interdict 
Colombia (T025 
policy/ budget and 
outcome for IDP)
Structural interdict 
in Argentina 
(Agüero –budget, 
plan, outcome for 
housing)
Ty
pe
 o
f 
D
ef
en
ce
We took it into 
consideration
Our existing policy is 
reasonable
We do not have 
enough resources 
to achieve x
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13. Conceptual Challenges 
and How to Overcome Them
Myth-busting
There are some common misconceptions about the feasibility of enforcing ESC rights 
by judicial means that will be helpful to reflect upon in order to facilitate an informed 
discussion in terms of future options for Scotland. These misconceptions tend to 
feature legitimate concerns about the viability or legitimacy of the judiciary impeding 
on decisions that should be kept within the realm of the legislature or the executive. 
However, as demonstrated by the case study examples provided in this paper these 
critiques can be mitigated and overcome in well-conceived and constitutionally 
appropriate models of adjudication.
The anti-democratic critique of ESC adjudication questions whether the court can 
legitimately interfere in resource dependent policy areas usurping the power of the 
legislature or executive. However, civil and political rights are also resource dependent 
and at times also require the court to intervene as an accountability mechanism. When 
the court intervenes in civil and political rights determination it does so as an important 
accountability check on the executive or legislature rather than as a means of usurping 
the power of other branches of government. One way in which this can occur is to use 
different types of remedies – some of which may afford larger degrees of deference 
back to decision makers depending on the circumstances. The court as an intervener 
in the enforcement of ESC rights is therefore an important part of a multi-institutional 
dialogue ensuring accountability rather than a transfer of political power to the 
judiciary.
The indeterminacy critique of ESC adjudication tells us that ESC rights are too vague 
and that their substantive interpretation should not be left to judges or to unelected 
UN Committees rather than elected officials. In the same way that CP rights require 
interpretation so too do ESC rights – and in a similar vein, courts can play an important 
role in giving substance and meaning to ESC rights in the same way that they do 
with CP rights. This does not require the court to usurp the role of the legislature or 
executive. If the legislature gives clear instructions to the court on how to interpret 
rights it can assist in the court fulfilling its role as a guarantor of rights and thus 
avoiding abdication of this important judicial function. In the determination of CP 
rights domestic courts can refer to, and are sometimes obliged to consider (or keep 
pace with), a supranational court, such as the European Court of Human Rights.173 A 
concern that sometimes emerges by those rejecting ESC justiciability is that, in the 
determination of ESC rights, there is no international or regional body of jurisprudence 
to assist in the interpretation of rights. However, this is based on a misconception. ESC 
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rights are adjudicated upon and are increasingly well defined in international, regional 
and domestic law.174 There are regional mechanisms, such as the Collective Complaints 
Procedure under the Committee of Social Rights responsible for interpreting state 
obligations under the European Social Charter and the Optional Protocol to ICESCR 
providing a complaints mechanism function for the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. Whilst the UK has not signed up to these regional or international 
complaints mechanisms (the latter of which is still in its infancy) the cases emerging 
from the treaty bodies can act as helpful sources of interpretation. Other regional courts, 
such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, have developed adjudication on ESC 
rights and its jurisprudence can act as an interpretative tool.175 Likewise, other sources 
of interpretation can include General Comments from UN treaty bodies, treaty body 
decisions and recommendations and jurisprudence from other jurisdictions, such as 
those discussed above.
Third, the capacity critique tells us that courts do not have the capacity to deal with 
ESC rights, that there would be a flood of litigation and that judges do not have 
the expertise to determine the substance ESC rights or their complex relationship 
with other areas of governance. Again, in the same way that CP rights are subject to 
adjudication similar rules can apply in relation to ESC rights. For example, floods of 
cases can be avoided through collective litigation or the ‘test and sist’ approach used in 
the Scottish court system and the new procedures under Rule 2.2 or the Civil Litigation 
(Expenses and Group Proceedings) (Scotland) Act 2018.
Most importantly, in the same way CP rights are protected, adjudication can be a means 
of last resort only available after all other remedies have been exhausted. Courts can 
also help support their capacity by seeking expertise on ESC rights where needed, 
including the appointment of amicus curiae (a ‘friend of the court’) if required. As above, 
in the same way the court can draw on expertise in relation to CP or constitutional 
matters it can also refer to various sources of domestic and international law, 
comparative case law, international guidance as well as domestic experts in order to 
assist in capacity building when adjudicating ESC rights. When ESC rights engage with 
far reaching policy considerations the court can ask the legislature or executive to justify 
its approach, in the same way that it does so in relation to CP rights.
The complexity of adjudication in the area of human rights cuts across all different types 
of rights – it is not unique to the ESC rights domain. It is important to remember that 
some CP as well as ESC rights have core components that are non-derogable as well 
as components subject to limitation if justifiable. A more nuanced understanding of 
the nature of ESC rights helps contextualise the different ways in which the court can 
appropriately review ESC compatibility in a democratically legitimate way. In this sense, 
the critiques of ESC adjudication are important matters to address when considering 
how best to accommodate ESC justiciability within any given constitutional context. 
However, importantly, these concerns are not insurmountable barriers and should not 
result in the outright rejection of ESC justiciability or judicial enforcement. As Wolffe 
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identifies: “The question of whether the Courts should be given that role – or any other 
role in relation to economic and social rights – seems to me, ultimately, to be a political or 
constitutional question, not a conceptual one.”176
Constitutional safeguards
As with any proposed constitutional or legislative change which alters the way human 
rights are protected, it is important to consider how to ensure constitutional safeguards 
are in place. In the UK the enforcement of human rights by the courts has traditionally 
been a source of contention. There is a concern that court adjudication on rights 
undermines the separation of powers. It is argued that judicial enforcement of rights 
lacks democratic legitimacy and that deference to parliament is the most appropriate 
approach in the determination of human right issues.177
It is acknowledged these concerns can become heightened in connection with 
affording the judiciary the power to determine ESC rights in areas of complex policy that 
directly engage the allocation of state resources. Of course, it is a legitimate concern 
that judicial supremacy could usurp the role of the legislature in determining matters 
relating to the allocation of limited resources across different socio-economic areas.178 
At the same time, the judiciary must be able to hold the legislature and executive to 
account, including in the determination of rights. This is of particular importance if 
the legislature has taken steps to create obligations to fulfil rights and to instruct the 
judiciary, as well as other public bodies, to comply with them. And so, while it may be 
inappropriate to afford unelected judges a monopoly on decisions regarding wide 
reaching policy areas with far reaching budgetary implications that does not preclude 
the judiciary from having any role whatsoever in the process of determining ESC 
compatibility.
In Colombia the court has been criticised for breaching the separation of powers 
by making orders which have an impact for allocation of public resources.179 On the 
other hand, the court has been applauded for assuming its role as ‘the guardian of the 
constitution’ and as a guarantor of human rights.180 One of the unique approaches of 
the court and the use of the tutela has been to have a safety mechanism for the most 
vulnerable and the most disadvantaged groups facing absolute destitution. So whilst 
there is an expectation that recipients should in the first place access benefits and 
challenge decisions through other administrative means the tutela device is there as a 
fast-track process for those in desperate need. This has resulted in under-represented 
groups having a means through which to promote their interests through institutional 
channels and has encouraged decision-makers to take ESC rights seriously and to 
prioritise them politically – hence avoiding the need to use tutela by mainstreaming 
the requirements for a social minimum as part of everyday policy development and the 
decision making process.181
In the case of Argentina the development of case law after the introduction of new 
constitutional guarantees leading to the enforcement of economic and social rights 
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required the development of new standards and criteria and a new type of litigation 
culture and practice in order to develop a judicial approach to the new norms that 
were introduced under the constitution – including the direct incorporation of 
international standards. One litigation mechanism to which the court responded to was 
when claimants faced urgent situations.182 Another effective judicial mechanism was 
facilitating collective complaints (class actions) or responding to a number of individual 
claims dealing with the same issue as a means of managing a response to situations of 
desperation.183 This is another example of how different constitutional settings adjust to 
the adoption of new human rights norms and is indicative of how Scotland could also 
adjust its own existing practice to accommodate ESC rights.
Similarly, it is important to bear in mind that litigation is not the only way to advance 
or protect social rights, nor is it always the most effective strategy. A court’s role, while 
necessary, is also limited – the ‘effective protection of ESC rights should be a holistic 
enterprise’ – executive, legislative and judicial.184 It is for this reason that is helpful to 
reflect on the responsibilities of the legislature, executive and judiciary in a multi-
institutional approach to human rights protection. In the end, if a state is serious about 
genuine enforcement and enjoyment of human rights then it must take steps to ensure 
effective judicial remedies are available, at least as a means of last resort, if the other 
institutional mechanisms fail to comply with international human rights standards.
Separation of powers
Rather than view the adjudication of ESC rights as a threat to the separation of powers 
the constitution could reflect a multi-institutional system where compatibility with 
ESC rights is shared between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary – where 
one holds another to account and the judiciary acts as a means of last resort. There are 
different ways of balancing the separation of powers between institutions in any given 
constitution. Scotland could reflect upon the most appropriate approach in a devolved 
constitutional setting. The devolved framework already provides a form of constitutional 
status to ECHR rights and according to the UN Committee on ESC Rights countries 
should implement ESC rights in the same way that they do so with CP rights. In Scotland 
this would mean affording ESC rights a similar constitutional footing within devolved 
competency.
There are a variety of institutional safeguards employed throughout the world in 
order to ensure balance in the separation of powers when determining human rights, 
including ESC rights. For example, the Constitution of Argentina permits the executive 
to derogate from fundamental rights if there is a two thirds majority in both houses 
of parliament. In Canada the courts have the power to strike down unconstitutional 
legislation, including legislation that contravenes human rights.185 However, parliament 
has the power to override compliance with the constitutional Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms186 (the ‘notwithstanding’ clause). This places the final say on human 
rights compliance back in the hands of the legislature; at the same time, the use of the 
clause risks strong political opposition. At the very least, it places compliance as the 
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default position and derogation from rights as a secondary position that can only occur 
in a transparent and explicit declaration following a parliamentary vote. As a result it has 
very rarely been used in practice in Canada and is viewed as controversial power only to 
be deployed in times of emergency.
The Canadian courts have also employed mechanisms such as delayed remedies to 
allow the legislature time to comply with judgments when violations of rights have 
been identified.187 The delayed remedy is a mechanism through which the court 
can afford the other arms of state time to make the necessary changes to ensure 
human rights compatibility. For example in Canada the Supreme Court has previously 
suspended the declaration of invalidity under section 52(1) of Canada’s Constitution Act 
1982 for one year to allow Parliament sufficient time to avoid an eventual regulatory 
void.188
This approach to delayed remedies has already been applied in the Scottish context. 
For example, in 2013 the Supreme Court held that section 72(10) of the Agricultural 
Holdings (Scotland) Act 2003 was incompatible with the ECHR (A1P1).189 Rather than 
strike down the legislation, the Court used section 102 of the Scotland Act 1998 and 
suspended the effect of its decision for 12 months, allowing the Scottish Ministers time 
to ensure compatibility and to leave the means through which to make the matter 
compatible as one to be determined by Scottish Ministers (facilitating deference to the 
executive). This is an innovative approach to remedies and exemplifies the capacity of 
the court to meet the demands of ESC rights adjudication. Each of these examples are 
indicative of attempts to balance responsibility for human rights compliance between 
the different arms of the state in a multi-institutional framework.
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14. Conclusion
Scotland is on a progressive human rights journey and is in the process of exploring 
multiple different avenues to better protect the broad array of international human 
rights. Following on from the SHRC paper in 2015 on ESC rights190 this paper introduces 
the breadth of constitutional models that are utilised across the globe reflecting the 
different approaches to ESC enforcement already underway internationally. What 
is clear from the comparative analysis is that other countries have taken steps to 
constitutionalise, legislate, incorporate and make justiciable ESC rights. It is within the 
power of the Scottish Parliament to observe and implement international human rights 
law, including ESC rights, in devolved areas and incorporation of such rights can occur 
through multiple pathways. In other words, Scotland can take steps to address ESC 
rights in devolved areas by exploring various forms of incorporation and justiciability 
should political impetus embrace this journey. This includes the option of creating a 
framework that facilitates access to effective remedies for violations of such rights.
Ultimately, it is for the people of Scotland, through their political representatives, 
to choose how best Scotland is governed. This paper seeks to inform the discourse 
around human rights reform in Scotland so that processes associated with broader 
constitutional change are evidence led. Scotland can build on the international 
comparative experience by creating a constitutionally appropriate framework in 
a devolved context. The comparative analysis tells us that best practice embeds 
incorporation across the legislative, executive and judicial branches in a multi-
institutional approach to human rights with access to innovative and effective remedies 
The opportunity to develop the human rights legal framework on this basis not only 
sets a path for other devolved jurisdictions, or for the UK as a whole, but could place 
Scotland as a leading international example of best practice.
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Appendix 1: Examples of Constitutions protecting ESC 
rights (in addition to CP rights)
Sample Constitutions that explicitly protect economic, 
social and cultural rights (Europe)
Albania 1998 (rev. 2016); Andorra 1993; Belgium 1831 (rev. 2014); Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 1995 (rev. 2009); Croatia 1991 (rev. 2013); Czech Republic 1993 (rev. 
2013); Liechtenstein 1921 (rev. 2011); Macedonia (Republic of ) 1991 (rev. 2011); 
Montenegro 2007 (rev. 2013); Poland 1997 (rev. 2009); Portugal 1976 (rev. 2005); 
Slovakia 1992 (rev. 2014)
Sample Constitutions that implicitly protect economic, 
social and cultural rights (Europe)
Andorra 1993; Belarus 1994 (rev. 2004); Belgium 1831 (rev. 2014); Bulgaria 1991 (rev. 
2015); Croatia 1991 (rev. 2013); Finland 1999 (rev. 2011); Hungary 2011 (rev. 2016); 
Ireland 1937 (rev. 2015); Italy 1947 (rev. 2012); Latvia 1922 (reinst. 1991, rev. 2016); 
Luxembourg 1868 (rev. 2009); Moldova (Republic of ) 1994 (rev. 2016); Montenegro 
2007 (rev. 2013); Poland 1997 (rev. 2009); Portugal 1976 (rev. 2005); Romania 1991 
(rev. 2003); Serbia 2006; Slovakia 1992 (rev. 2014); Spain 1978 (rev. 2011); Sweden 
1974 (rev. 2012); Switzerland 1999 (rev. 2014); Ukraine 1996 (rev. 2014)
Sample Constitutions that explicitly protect economic, 
social and cultural rights (Global)
Albania 1998 (rev. 2016); Algeria 1989 (reinst. 1996, rev. 2016); Andorra 1993; Angola 
2010; Argentina 1853 (reinst. 1983, rev. 1994); Armenia 1995 (rev. 2015); Belgium 
1831 (rev. 2014); Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995 (rev. 2009); Burkina Faso 1991 (rev. 
2012); Burundi 2005; Cambodia 1993 (rev. 2008); Cape Verde 1980 (rev. 1992); Central 
African Republic 2004 (rev. 2010); Central African Republic 2013; Chad 1996 (rev. 
2005); Chile 1980 (rev. 2015); Congo (Democratic Republic of the) 2005 (rev. 2011); 
Côte d’Ivoire 2016; Croatia 1991 (rev. 2013); Czech Republic 1993 (rev. 2013); Ecuador 
2008 (rev. 2015); Egypt 2014; El Salvador 1983 (rev. 2014); Equatorial Guinea 1991 
(rev. 2012); Eritrea 1997; Ethiopia 1994; Gabon 1991 (rev. 2011); Guatemala 1985 
(rev. 1993); Guinea-Bissau 1984 (rev. 1996); Guyana 1980 (rev. 2016); Iran (Islamic 
Republic of ) 1979 (rev. 1989); Iraq 2005; Lesotho 1993 (rev. 2011); Liechtenstein 1921 
(rev. 2011); Macedonia (Republic of ) 1991 (rev. 2011); Madagascar 2010; Mali 1992; 
Marshall Islands 1979 (rev. 1995); Mexico 1917 (rev. 2015); Mongolia 1992 (rev. 2001); 
Montenegro 2007 (rev. 2013); Morocco 2011; Mozambique 2004 (rev. 2007); Nepal 
2006 (rev. 2012); Nepal 2015 (rev. 2016); Nicaragua 1987 (rev. 2014); Niger 2010; 
Paraguay 1992 (rev. 2011); Peru 1993 (rev. 2009); Philippines 1987; Poland 1997 (rev. 
2009); Portugal 1976 (rev. 2005); Sao Tome and Principe 1975 (rev. 1990); Senegal 
2001 (rev. 2009); Singapore 1963 (rev. 2010); Slovakia 1992 (rev. 2014); Suriname 1987 
(rev. 1992); Swaziland 2005; Timor-Leste 2002; Turkey 1982 (rev. 2011); Turkmenistan 
2008; Uganda 1995 (rev. 2005); Uzbekistan 1992 (rev. 2011); Yemen 1991 (rev. 2015)
50
Scottish Human Rights Commission
Appendix 2: UN Recommendations in Scotland
Case Example: Right to adequate housing – an 
accountability gap?
In recent times the UK has undergone scrutiny by the UN Special Rapporteur 
on housing who raised significant concerns about access to the right including 
the adverse impact on particularly vulnerable groups including: those living in 
poverty, homeless persons, the disabled, the elderly, young people, the Gypsy 
traveller community, migrants, Roma and the catholic community in Northern 
Ireland.191
The UK has for a long time provided welfare and benefits through a number 
of different statutory schemes and when asked about implementing the right 
to housing the UK refers to the broad base of welfare based legislation that 
constitutes the structure of the welfare state.192 However, the legislation, whether 
derived from Westminster or the devolved level, is not necessarily designed to 
comply with international standards, which can create a housing rights gap.
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the body responsible 
for monitoring UK compliance with ICESCR has raised concerns about the 
‘persistent critical situation in terms of the availability, affordability and 
accessibility of adequate housing… in part as a result of cuts in State benefits.’193 
The Committee also raised concerns about the lack of social housing, forcing 
households to move into the private rental sector, which is also not adequate in 
terms of affordability, habitability, accessibility and security of tenure.194
The Committee has recommended that the state:
uu addresses its housing deficit by ensuring a sufficient supply of housing, 
especially for the most disadvantaged and marginalised groups, including 
middle and low income individuals/ households, young people and persons 
with disabilities;
uu regulates the private rental sector, including through security of tenure 
protection and accountability mechanisms;
uu addresses bad housing, including substandard housing and conditions and 
uninhabitable housing;
uu ensures access to adequate access to culturally appropriate accommodation 
for the Roma, Gypsy and Traveller communities with access to adequate 
services such as water and sanitation; and
uu addresses outstanding issues relating to homelessness.195
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How can Scotland comply with the right to housing?
Scotland could implement housing legislation in compliance with the right 
to adequate housing as defined in international law by ensuring accessibility, 
affordability, availability and quality of housing in Scotland in the public and 
private sphere. In addition, Scotland could take steps to ensure effective 
remedies are available if the right to adequate housing is violated. In many 
respects Scotland has taken steps to provide housing in a human rights 
compatible way. For example, the Homelessness etc. (Scotland) Act 2003 has 
been commended as an example of best practice by UN treaty monitoring 
bodies, especially its provision relating to the right to housing as an enforceable 
right.196 Other examples of good practice include, the Homeowner and Debtor 
Protection (Scotland) Act 2010; the abolition of priority need in homelessness 
applications in 2012; more robust tenancy arrangements introduced under 
the Private Housing (Tenancies) (Scotland) Act 2016; the Repairing Standard 
imposing an obligation on landlords to maintain minimum habitability 
requirements under the Housing (Scotland) Act 2006; and the Scottish Social 
Housing Charter 2012 which sets out standards of quality in the social housing 
sector.
More could be done to ensure that Scotland complies with the international 
standards set out in ICESCR and other international treaties. By doing so 
Scotland could take the lead as an example of best practice in the provision 
of housing. By incorporating the right to adequate housing into Scots law the 
existing examples of best practice could be measured against international 
standards to ensure gaps do not emerge – such as for example ensuring 
that housing is not provided in a discriminatory manner – such as excluding 
particular vulnerable groups (disabled, elderly, migrant communities, Scottish 
Gypsy Traveller community and so on).
If seeking to ensure compliance with international human rights the Scottish 
Parliament and Scottish Government must create a devolved framework that 
ensures availability; adequacy; habitability; affordability; accessibility; security 
of tenure; provides housing in appropriate locations and the adoption of a 
national housing strategy – each of the components required in international 
law. Part of this requirement should include ensuring access to effective 
remedies should for any reason access to the right to housing be undermined.
For example, in relation to Scotland specifically the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights has highlighted the chronic shortage of social 
housing particularly for the most disadvantaged and marginalised, such as 
persons with disabilities.197 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 
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(UNCRC) has urged Scotland, as well as other parts of the UK, to strictly 
implement the legal prohibition of prolonged placement of children in 
temporary accommodation by public authorities; to reduce homelessness and 
to ensure that children have access to adequate housing that provides physical 
safety, adequate space, protection against threats to health and structural 
hazards, including cold, damp, heat and pollution and accessibility for children 
with disabilities; and to introduce a statutory duty for local authorities to 
provide safe and adequate sites for travellers.198
Case example: Right to social security – an accountability gap?
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has consistently 
raised concerns that the UK is not complying with the right to social security. In 
the last review by the Committee it raised deep concerns about
“the various changes in the entitlements to, and cuts in, social benefits 
introduced by the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and the Welfare Reform and 
Work Act 2016, such as the reduction of the household benefit cap, the 
removal of the spare-room subsidy (bedroom tax), the four-year freeze 
on certain benefits and the reduction in child tax credits. The Committee 
is particularly concerned about the adverse impact of these changes and 
cuts on the enjoyment of the rights to social security and to an adequate 
standard of living by disadvantaged and marginalized individuals and 
groups, including women, children, persons with disabilities, low-income 
families and families with two or more children. The Committee is also 
concerned about the extent to which the State party has made use of 
sanctions in relation to social security benefits and the absence of due 
process and access to justice for those affected by the use of sanctions.”199
In addition the European Committee on Social Rights has concluded that the UK 
is not in conformity with the right to social security as required by the European 
Social Charter. The European Social Charter requires states to establish, maintain 
and progressively improve a social security system.200 The Committee concluded 
in January 2018 that the level of Statutory Sick Pay and long-term incapacity 
benefits are inadequate as well as the minimum levels of employment support 
allowance and unemployment benefits.201
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How can Scotland comply with the right to social security?
Under the terms of devolution the Scottish Parliament has the devolved 
competence to implement international obligations in devolved areas.202 
Under the initial terms of devolution much of the social security system 
remained a reserved matter meaning that responsibility for legislating for and 
implementing the right remained with Westminster. In 2016 the UK Parliament 
partially devolved responsibility for social security to the Scottish Parliament in 
areas including housing, fuel, food, and disability benefits.203 The Scottish Social 
Security (Scotland) Act provides for a number of Social Security principles, one 
of which recognises that ‘social security is itself a human right and essential 
to the realisation of other human rights’.204 The Scottish Government has 
committed to ‘delivering a rights based approach to social security’.205
There is nothing in the legislative framework that affords a statutory footing to 
the right to social security with reference to international law as a benchmark 
coupled with an effective remedy.
Prior to enactment a non-government amendment206 to the legislation was 
introduced by the Scottish Human Rights Commission to include a duty to have 
due regard to the right to social security as defined in international human 
rights law, including Article 9 ICESCR. The Scottish Parliament considered the 
amendment at Stage 2 of the Bill process and rejected the proposal.207 This duty 
if implemented could have had a potentially transformative impact by providing 
a legal underpinning to the Scottish Government and Scottish Parliament’s 
previously articulated commitments to provide a statutory footing to social 
security as a human right. A duty to have due regard creates a procedural duty 
to consider, in this case the right to social security as defined in international 
human rights law, when implementing the statutory regime.208 This duty was 
not included in the Act. Further steps could be taken to align the new devolved 
social security obligations to ensure implementation is in accordance with the 
requirements of international human rights law.
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